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Sino-Soviet Relations:

An Interoffice Projection Based on Quantitative Methods

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27 September 1977

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DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

OFFICE OF REGIONAL AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS

Progress Report No. 24

27 September 1977

This project consists of three quantitative approaches to Sino-Soviet relations. A team of analysts, drawn from various components of the CIA and concerned with different aspects of Chinese and Soviet affairs, examines on a continuing basis all relevant intelligence items. The first part of this project is to consider the effect of this evidence on the possibility of one or another level of Sino-Soviet hostilities. The analysts' numerical assessments of the likelihood of such hostilities, calculated according to the Bayesian formula of probabilities, are presented in the graph on page 2. The second part of the project is an application of the same Bayesian technique to scenarios of improved relations. The third part of this project is a chart of Sino-Soviet tensions, based upon subjective overall evaluation by the participants. Progress reports are published on a periodic basis by the Office of Regional and Political Analysis.

Principal Trends:

Since the last report (25 July), evidence indicates that the probability of hostilities within six months remains very low (page 2). The Chinese have accused the Soviets of harassing Chinese vessels on both border rivers (item 2).

Various items indicate that the likelihood of significant improvements in Sino-Soviet relations still remains low (page 3 and items 3, 4 and 5). The overall level of tension between the two countries decreased (page 6).

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NOTE: Comments on these reports will be welcomed by [redacted]
[redacted] of ORPA, who are coordinating this project.


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A Bayesian Analysis of the Likelihood of Sino-Soviet Hostilities


A

The Soviets will undertake a nuclear strike against Chinese strategic or nuclear targets within six months.




B

The Soviets will launch a large scale conventional attack against China within six months.




C

Either side will launch a localized cross-border attack, with limited objectives, on a scale larger than the 1969 incidents, within six months.



D

Either side will undertake a deliberate policy of provocation on the border short of cross-border attacks designed to or bound to increase tensions.



— Average figures for Soviet analysts
 - - Average figures for Chinese analysts


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A Bayesian Analysis of the Likelihood of Improvements in Sino-Soviet Relations


G

There will be an effort to settle the border dispute within six months.




H

There will be an effort to significantly improve economic relations within six months.




I

There will be an effort to restore party-to-party relations within six months.




J

There will be an effort to issue a joint statement about mutual relations within six months.



K

There will be an effort to hold a meeting of Politburo-level representatives within six months.



———— Average figures for Soviet analysts
 - - - - - Average figures for Chinese analysts

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ITEMS OF EVIDENCE
8 September 1977

1. A lengthy and authoritative article in the July issue of *Red Flag* presented a systematic and comprehensive analysis of the Soviet Union as "the most dangerous source of a new world war." The article essentially amplified in great detail attacks on Moscow made first by Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien in a 6 June speech, and thereafter in a 16 July *People's Daily* commentary article. [REDACTED]

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2. In early August Peking took the unusual step of stating specific Chinese complaints to a third-country diplomat. A Chinese Foreign Ministry official accused the Soviets of harassing Chinese vessels on both border rivers, and imposing restrictions on Chinese salmon fishing in the Ussuri. The official stated that there was "no possibility" of a change in overall Sino-Soviet relations, whatever the outcome of the navigation talks. [REDACTED]

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3. Deputy Foreign Minister Yu Chan told a Swedish newsman in mid-August that the Soviet state is becoming "capitalistic," that Russians "will not obey when Brezhnev calls them to arms," and that with the present Kremlin leadership "good relations are impossible." [REDACTED]

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4. Major CCP statements in July and August sustained Peking's policy of openly polemicizing with Moscow. On 21 July the communique of the Party's 3rd Plenum called for the CCP to "carry through to the end" the struggle against the Soviet "revisionist" clique. On 12 August Party Chairman Hua Kuo-feng firmly upheld Peking's longstanding policy on Sino-Soviet relations in his remarks on PRC foreign policy at the 11th CCP Congress. Hua reaffirmed Peking's willingness to improve state relations on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and stated that ideological differences will continue "for a long time." Claiming that Moscow has not shown "one iota of good faith" about improving state relations, Hua accused the Soviets of obstructing the border talks, of pressuring China to abandon its Marxist-Leninist principles, and of slandering Peking before world opinion. Hua demanded that Moscow demonstrate its interest in improved state relations with Peking with "concrete deeds." [REDACTED]

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5. Soviet commentaries at the end of August stressed the anti-Soviet tenor of the 11th CCP Congress. They claimed that the Congress changed little of importance of the Maoist policies which brought Sino-Soviet relations to the present impasse, implying that Moscow sees no improvement in the prospects for better relations with Peking. [REDACTED]

6. The "trade exchange and payments" agreement for 1977 was signed in Moscow by a Chinese delegation on 21 July. The Soviet deputy trade representative in Peking stated [REDACTED] there that he expects Sino-Soviet trade in 1977 to be "about 15 percent less" than in 1976, partly due to unusually high deliveries in 1976 and partly to China's inability in 1977 to supply some agricultural products, such as pork. Some "20-30 percent" of Sino-Soviet contracts under the 1976 protocol have not been signed. The main problem is price. [REDACTED]

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
7. China's new Ambassador to the USSR, Wang Yu-ping, departed for Moscow on 24 August "by train." He arrived in Moscow on 30 August. [REDACTED]

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Individual Assessments of Sino-Soviet Tensions



The points on this chart were chosen by each participant on an intuitive basis, using the rough guidelines shown on the chart

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